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Abstract
While parties in many new democracies frequently split, merge, change labels,
and make and break electoral alliances, comparative systematic research on how these
changes are related to each other is limited. Literature on political parties often treats
di↵erent forms of party change as manifestations of a singular and single-dimensional
phenomenon of party instability. This study examines the dimensionality of party
structural change in 11 countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We apply Multiple
Correspondence Analysis to an original dataset that di↵erentiates between five types
of party structural change and examines 780 party-electoral term dyads. Our findings
contradict the idea of party structural change as a uni-dimensional phenomenon. In-
stead we distinguish between between two types of change: temporary change (entry
to and exit from electoral coalitions and changes in electoral labels) and permanent
change (splits and mergers). A more fine-grained classification also discerns between
change that brings about party system aggregation and fragmentation. These findings
imply that di↵erent types of party structural change can not be accounted for by the
same factors.
⇤This research has received funding from the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions Programme (Intra-
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1 Introduction
Political parties and party systems are crucial institutions for the functioning of a modern
representative democracy. Among other functions, political parties aggregate and represent
various interests in policy-making and ensure the accountability of democratic government
to voters. The ability of parties to fulfil these functions varies across democracies and time
periods though. The literature on third wave democracies, in particular, has called into
question parties’ ability to assure voter representation, electoral accountability and e↵ective
governance. This is to large extent because in newer democracies, unlike in many older
democracies (with notable exceptions of Italy or, more recently, Greece), party alternatives
that voters face at elections change frequently. New parties emerge and existing parties
disappear, split, merge or combine themselves into fluid electoral alliances.1 Such instability
of party alternatives in elections may undermine the representation of citizens’ preferences
because voters are not able to learn about parties’ policy positions (Marinova 2015). Voters’
ability to form stable partisan attachments is also impeded; indeed, several recent studies
suggest that the instability in party alternatives is closely related to high levels of electoral
volatility in newer democracies (Tavits 2008a; Powell and Tucker 2014). In addition, the
electorate is less likely to be able to hold parties accountable if they undergo structural
changes between elections (Birch 2003; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). In this paper, we o↵er
a qualified critique of such claims by demonstrating that some forms of party change that
are permanent and largely clarify party systems are clearly distinct from temporary forms
of change that may be more likely to confuse voters.
The importance of party instability notwithstanding, the causes and consequences of its
di↵erent forms have not received equal attention in the party politics literature. On the one
hand, the emergence of new parties has been studied extensively (Harmel and Robertson
1985; Hug 2001; Lucardie 2000; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2008b). Also, a number of theoretically
1In this study, “electoral coalitions” and “electoral alliances” are used interchangeably to refer to joint
candidate lists in national elections, as discussed in the section on data and measurement.
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and empirically sophisticated studies examined party instability from the perspective of in-
dividual legislators or candidates (Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Laver and Benoit 2003; Kreuzer
and Pettai 2003; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; Desposato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2008;
McMenamin and Gwiazda 2011; Mershon and Shvetsova 2013). On the other hand, only
more recently, several systematic studies have examined other types of party instability, in-
cluding electoral (pre-)coalitions (Kaminski 2001; Golder 2006; Blais and Indridason 2007;
Ibenskas 2015b), party survival and death (Bakke and Sitter 2013; Bolleyer 2013), party
splits (Ceron 2015) and mergers (Be´langer and Godbout 2010; Lees, Hough and Keith 2010;
Ware 2009; Ibenskas 2015a).
An important gap in this literature concerns the lack of theoretical and empirical analysis
of the relationship between di↵erent types of party instability. It is often assumed that
new party entries, splits, mergers, electoral coalitions and party dissolutions cluster into a
single dimension that captures the amount of change (but see, for example, Kreuzer and
Pettai (2003)). Thus, the extent of instability at the level of individual parties, electoral
terms or countries is considered to be higher when more transformations are experienced2
and when the extent of these individual changes is more substantial.3 For instance, Janda
(1980) develops an ordinal scale of organisational discontinuity (as one indicator of party
institutionalisation) that uses the number and extent of party mergers and splits. Rose and
Mackie (1988) study “party careers” in terms of four-item ordinal scale: persistence without
change, minor modifications (minor splits and mergers), structural changes (major splits and
mergers), and party dissolution. More recently, Litton (2013), Marinova (2015) and Casal-
Bertoa, Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2015) have proposed indexes of party instability /
volatility that seek to summarise the number and/or extent of splits, mergers, entries to and
exits from electoral coalitions, genuinely new parties, and party dissolutions. Such aggregate
measures of party instability could potentially provide a measure of an alternative of the
2In a similar vein, most studies on legislative party switching also do not di↵erentiate between di↵erent
types of switching (e.g. defections by individual legislators, party splits and mergers).
3For example, several studies di↵erentiate between major and minor splits in terms of the share of elites
or activists who leave to establish a new party.
3
widely-used Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979) by analysing the causes
and consequences of elite-level instability separately from voter volatility. They assume
though that party instability is a single-dimensional phenomenon. Whether and how much
di↵erent types of party instability are manifestations of a single phenomenon and dimension,
however, is an under-researched empirical question. Thus, our main research question is how
do di↵erent types of party instability cluster empirically?
To answer this question, we focus on party splits, mergers, entries to and exits from
electoral coalitions, and changes in the electoral labels of parties as forms of party structural
change. Unlike some of the above-mentioned studies, we consider party structural change as
a distinct phenomenon both from new party emergence and disappearance (party dissolution
or hibernation). In the next section we discuss theoretical arguments for and against the
single-dimensional view of party structural change. We argue that for this approach to be
supported, di↵erent types of change have to be accounted for the same factors. Following
that, we present the results of our empirical analysis of parties in 11 countries in Central and
Eastern Europe in the period between 1990-2015. Our findings suggest that party structural
change is a multi-dimensional phenomenon: temporary and permanent change emerge as
two distinct dimensions in the Multiple Correspondence Analysis of 780 party-electoral term
dyads (i.e. our unit of analysis is each party in each electoral term). The electoral term refers
to the period between two elections i and i+1. Moreover, both temporary and permanent
change can either lead towards fragmentation or aggregation. These distinct types of party
structural change are also present at the level of parties, electoral terms and countries. Using
this four-dimensional view, we discuss the patterns of party structural change in Central and
Eastern Europe in the last 25 years. Furthermore, we also examine the correlations between
these dimension scores and several key explanations of party structural change, and provide
insights on why such a clustering emerges. In the final section, we summarise our results.
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2 Theoretical expectations
To develop theoretical expectations about the co-occurrence of di↵erent types of party
structural change, we consider their various explanations. By di↵erent types of party struc-
tural change we mean mergers, splits, the entry to and exit from electoral coalitions, and
the change in electoral labels. If the same underlying factors a↵ect all of them, then it is
likely that these di↵erent types of change will form a single dimension - i.e. occur together in
party-election dyads. One end of this dimension would represent the presence of change and
the other end would its absence. In contrast, if the underlying reasons for di↵erent types of
transformations are di↵erent, a single stability-change dimension would be unlikely to sur-
face; instead, the forms of party structural change and stability will be clustered in several
dimensions. In this section we discuss theoretical factors behind party transformation; the
empirical analysis below explores how much these theoretical expectations are supported by
empirical evidence.
Di↵erent types of party structural change may cluster on a single dimension for a number
of reasons. First, all forms of party structural change are more likely when the voters
of individual parties or the electorate as a whole have weak partisan attachments. For
example, Desposato (2006) and Mershon and Shvetsova (2013) argue that the electoral costs
of legislative switching are lower when their parties do not have strong partisan following
in the electorate. Similarly, Ibenskas (2015b) finds that party mergers are more likely when
constituent parties have weakly partisan electorates.
Second, a related finding shows that internally weakly institutionalised parties are also
more likely to change (Harmel and Janda 1994). Indeed, Janda (1980) uses party name
changes, splits and mergers as indicators of party institutionalisation. The two well-established
dimensions of internal party institutionalisation - low routinisation of internal party rules
and procedures and weak attachments of the members to the party as an institution (i.e.
low value infusion) (Levitsky 2003; Randall and Svasand 2002) - limit parties’ ability to
solve internal conflicts without splits. For the same reasons, low internal institutionalisation
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should also reduce the costs of adopting other types of change, such as the change of label
or the formation or termination of electoral coalitions, as a part of party’s electoral strategy.
Third, party structural change is also more likely when the composition of the dominant
coalition or the leadership of the party changes (Harmel and Janda 1994). A new dominant
coalition or leader are more likely to change the party’s relationship with other parties, either
by initiating mergers or electoral coalitions, or terminating existing alliances. At the same
time, loss of power or changes initiated by new leadership may motivate others to defect or
create a splinter party.
Fourth, the failure to achieve party’s goals is also an important factor of all types of party
structural change (Harmel and Janda 1994). For instance, electoral losses are related to party
platform change (Budge, Ezrow and McDonald 2010; Somer-Topcu 2009). Similarly, parties
may respond to electoral losses by merging with other parties (Co↵e´ and Torenvlied 2008),
entering or leaving electoral coalitions, or changing electoral labels. Other authors argue
that the expectations of electoral decline may drive party structural change. For example,
parties may change their platforms in response to the changes in the ideological positions
of their voters or the electorate (Adams, Clark, Ezrow and Glasgow 2006; Ezrow, De Vries,
Steenbergen and Edwards 2011). Similarly, such expectations also make party switching
more likely (McMenamin and Gwiazda 2011; O’Brien and Shomer 2013).
However, di↵erent types of party structural change may also not cluster around the single
dimension. For example, the expected e↵ect of electoral system disproportionality may be
di↵erent on party splits on the one hand, and mergers and the formation of electoral alliances
on the other hand. Parties should be more likely to split under proportional institutions while
lower proportionality should encourage party mergers (Co↵e´ and Torenvlied 2008; Be´langer
and Godbout 2010; Ibenskas 2015a) and electoral coalitions (Kaminski 2001; Golder 2005;
Blais and Indridason 2007; Ibenskas 2015b).
Several other factors such as party size and government status may a↵ect party structural
transformations in di↵erent ways. While small parties are more likely to enter electoral
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coalitions and merge, larger parties may also use these strategies to form the largest legislative
bloc (Golder 2006; Spirova 2007; Ibenskas 2015b) or become pivotal in a larger number
of alternative coalitions (Ibenskas 2015a). The e↵ects of party size on splits is less well-
established, although the literature on party switching often argues that larger parties are
less likely to lose MPs due to their higher legislative influence (Heller and Mershon 2008).
For splits, however, the opposite may also hold: splinters from larger parties are more likely
to be big enough to have a chance of legislative representation. Furthermore, we also examine
the relationship between party structural change and government status. Ceron (2015) finds
that opposition parties are generally more likely to split while government parties split with a
greater probability when the government has a large parliamentary majority. its probability
among government parties depends on the size of government majority. Ibenskas (2015a)
shows that the experience of cooperation in government increases the probability of party
mergers. Finally, ideological positions of parties may also a↵ect mergers, splits, electoral
coalitions and label changes in specific ways. Specifically, radical left and right parties are
less likely to participate in electoral coalitions (Ibenskas 2015b).
3 Data and measurement
As a first step to uncover the dimensionality of party structural change, we analyse data
for 11 current EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe from the first democratic
election to 2015 using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). The unit of analysis is
a party in a electoral term. The dataset covers those parties that received at least one
percent of the vote in election i).4 We exclude parties that dissolved during the electoral
term or did not run in the following election (election i+1 ). In total, the dataset includes
780 party-electoral term dyads in 71 electoral terms.
4For countries with bicameral legislatures, the electoral results in the lower chamber are considered. The
vote share of the parties included in an electoral coalition is estimated as the product of the vote share of
that electoral coalition and the ratio of seats won by that party to the number of won by the coalition. For
coalitions that received no seats, equal vote shares for all constituent parties are assumed.
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Five dichotomous variables capture the following types of party structural change: party
splits, party mergers, entries to a joint list, exits from a joint list, and the change of the
electoral label. We select only those parties whose actual or estimated vote share was one
percent or higher in election i regardless of their electoral results in i+1. For example, a split
is recorded if the splinter won less than one percent of votes after leaving the parent party, as
long as this splinter party contested next elections. Table 1 presents the cross-tabulation of
all five types of party structural change. In the remainder of this section, we briefly describe
the coding of each of these variables.
Table 1: Frequency of the types of party structural change
Split Merger Exit Entry Name
no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Split
no 620 0 503 117 467 153 434 186 287 333
yes 0 160 128 32 125 35 111 49 75 85
Merger
no 503 128 631 0 484 147 450 181 336 295
yes 117 32 0 149 108 41 95 54 26 123
Entry
no 467 125 484 108 592 0 459 133 328 264
yes 153 35 147 41 0 188 86 102 34 154
Exit
no 434 111 450 95 459 86 545 0 328 217
yes 186 49 181 54 133 102 0 235 34 201
Name
no 287 75 336 26 328 34 328 34 362 0
yes 333 85 295 123 264 154 217 201 0 418
Party splits. We only code splits after which the splinter party participated in election
i+1 as an independent entity or as part of an electoral coalition. Thus, the switching of
individual members or splinter factions between parties is not considered as a split.
Party mergers. Mergers are operationalised as the amalgamation of two or more au-
tonomous parties into a single party organisation. We consider only those mergers that
involved parties that gained at least one percent of the vote in election i.
An entry into an electoral coalition. Electoral coalition is operationalised as the
formation of a joint candidate list for the participation in national election by two or more
parties without integrating their organisations.5 We only include new coalitions, that is if
5The focus on joint candidate lists is justified by the fact that the countries analysed here used PR or mixed
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(1) the coalition in which the party participates in election i+1 includes at least two parties
that obtained at least one percent of the vote in election i, and (2) when at least one of
these parties did not already form an electoral coalition with other parties in this coalition
in election i. Thus, if two parties participated in election i independently or in di↵erent
coalitions, and formed an electoral coalition in election i+1, both of them are considered as
having entered an electoral coalition. Also, if two parties formed an electoral coalition for
elections i and i+1, but a third party joined this coalition only at election i+1, all three
parties are considered as having entered a new electoral coalition.
An exit from an electoral coalition is coded as such when (1) the coalition in which
the party participated in election i includes at least two parties that obtained at least one
percent of the vote in this election, and (2) when at least one of the parties in this coalition
did not form an electoral coalition with other parties in this coalition at the time of election
i+1. Thus, if two parties participated in election i+1 independently or in di↵erent electoral
coalitions, and they formed an electoral coalition in election i, both of them are considered
as having exited an electoral coalition. Also, if two parties formed an electoral coalition for
elections i and i+1, but third party is a member of this coalition only at election i, all three
parties are considered as having exited an electoral coalition in this electoral term.
The change in electoral label is coded as such when the label under which the party
runs in election i+1 is di↵erent from that under which it ran in election i. The coding does
not distinguish between reasons of electoral label change, which may include mergers, entries
to and exits from electoral coalitions, or strategic moves to increase party’s electoral appeal.
4 Empirical analysis
We use Multiple Correspondence Analysis for analysing our dataset. MCA is a well-
established exploratory technique for analysing multivariate categorical data (Bartholomew,
electoral systems. One exception is the 1990 election in Croatia, for which majoritarian electoral system was
used. We code joint candidates in single-member districts for this particular election. Furthermore, we also
do not consider weaker forms of electoral cooperation, such as public commitments to govern together.
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Steele, Galbraith and Moustaki 2008; Greenacre 2007; Le Roux and Rouanet 2010). MCA
allows us to scale our categorical raw data on party structural change along the lines of one
or several dimensions. The substantive meaning of these dimensions (also called “axes” of
the MCA solution) can be uncovered by analysing how variable categories (i.e. dichotomous
categories for the presence or absence of the five types of party structural change) are placed
with regard to each dimension, and how much these categories contribute to the variance on
each axis. Additionally, MCA also can place the individual observations (i.e. party-electoral
terms) and supplementary variables (i.e. other variables that do not a↵ect the solution of
the analysis, but are likely to be causally related to some or all types of party structural
change) in the same space as the categories.
4.1 Interpreting the dimensions
We are able to interpret meaningfully four axes of the solution that together explain 89.7
percent of the total variance. While the first dimension accounts for by far the most variance
(35.4 percent), the other three dimensions are also important and explain 20.4, 19.6 and 14.3
percent of the variance, respectively.
As a first step towards the substantive interpretation of the four axes, we present the
squared correlations between the variables and each of the dimensions in Figure 1. The
figure shows that the entry to and exit from electoral coalitions correlate highly with the
first and fourth dimensions; the merger and split variables correlate with the second and
fourth dimensions (although the merger variable also correlates moderately with the first
dimension); and name changes are related to the first dimension only. This strongly suggests
that di↵erent types of party structural change do not cluster into a single stability vs change
dimension.
As the second step in our analysis, we report the positions and contributions of 10
variable categories in Table 2. As recommended by Le Roux and Rouanet (2010, 52), when
interpreting the substantive meaning of individual dimensions, we examine those categories
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Figure 1: Squared correlation between the variables and MCA dimensions
whose contributions to the variance of the dimension are close to or exceed the average
contribution of 10 percent (obtained by dividing the total variance of 100 percent by 10
categories used in the analysis).
Had di↵erent types of party structural change clustered into a single dimension, we would
expect to observe (1) the positions of all ”yes” categories on one end of the first dimension
of the MCA solution and all ”no” categories on the other end of this dimension, and (2)
similar contributions of all categories to the first dimension. The results of our analysis indi-
cate a rather di↵erent pattern. The contribution of four categories (“entry yes”, “exit yes”,
“namechange yes” and “namechange no”) to the first dimension substantially exceeds 10
percent, and the contribution of two further categories (“entry no” and “merger yes”) is
close to 10 percent. The contribution of all other categories is substantially less than 10
percent. Among the categories that contribute to the first dimension most, “entry yes”,
“exit yes”, “namechange yes” and “merger yes” have positive values while “namechange no”
and “entry no” have negative values. We therefore interpret this dimension as Temporary
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change vs stability.6
Table 2: Multiple Correspondence Analysis of party structural change
Category Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 Dim 4
Coord. Contrib. Coord. Contrib. Coord. Contrib. Coord. Contrib.
entry yes 1.1 21.1 -0.3 2.2 0.3 3.5 -0.8 24.6
exit yes 1.1 17.8 -0.6 8.3 0.4 3.6 1.1 44.3
elecname no -0.9 20.2 -0.1 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.3
elecname yes 0.8 17.5 0.1 0.6 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 1.2
merger yes 0.8 7.1 1.4 35.0 -1.1 25.5 0.3 2.7
split no 0.0 0.0 -0.3 8.5 -0.4 11.9 0.0 0.1
split yes 0.0 0.0 1.3 32.9 1.5 46.1 0.1 0.4
merger no -0.2 1.7 -0.3 8.3 0.3 6.0 -0.1 0.6
exit no -0.4 5.6 0.2 2.6 -0.1 1.1 -0.4 14.1
entry no -0.5 9.1 0.1 0.9 -0.1 1.5 0.3 10.6
Unsurprisingly, the categories that contribute to the second dimension most are those
with limited contribution to the first dimension. Thus, categories “merger yes” and “split yes”
have positive values on this dimension, while category “split no” has negative values.7. We
interpret this dimension as Permanent change vs stability.
The same categories contribute to the third dimension, although this dimension contrasts
“split no” and “merger yes” on the one hand and “split yes” and “merger no” on the other
hand. We interpret this dimension as showing the type of permanent change in terms of
party aggregation vs fragmentation (Permanent aggregation vs fragmentation).
Finally, among the categories that contribute to the fourth dimension we find that “en-
try yes” and “exit no” have negative values and “exit yes” and “entry no” have positive
values. We interpret this dimension as the type of temporary change (Temporary aggrega-
tion vs fragmentation).
6The moderate contribution of “merger yes” to this dimension could be interpreted as a result of the
temporary nature of some mergers, which makes them quite similar to the formation of electoral alliances.
7“merger no” is also on the left of the second dimension although its contribution to this dimension is
only 6.4)
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4.2 Patterns of party stability and change in Central and Eastern
Europe
To substantiate the results of MCA, we discuss the patterns of party stability and change
in terms of the four dimensions in each of the 11 countries in our sample. Given a large
number of party-electoral term dyads (780 in total), we are unable to report the placement
of all parties in all electoral terms. We therefore use an important feature of MCA - its
ability to place the so-called supplementary variables in the same space with the categories
of the variables used in the analysis. Supplementary variables can be causes or consequences
of the phenomena examined by MCA, but for multi-level data they may also indicate the
placement of the units in which the observations are nested (e.g. countries or time units).
Substantial distances between the categories of supplementary variables on the dimensions
uncovered by MCA indicate that these variables are likely to account for the variation in
the scores of this dimension. Le Roux and Rouanet (2010, 59) suggest that the di↵erences
of 0.5 are “notable” and the di↵erences of 1 are “large”.
Table 3: Prevalence of the patterns of party structural change: electoral terms
Permanent change
Limited High: aggregatory High: fragmentary
Temporary Limited 23 (32%) 8 (11%) 8 (11%)
change High: aggregatory 9 (13%) 3 (4%) 5 (7%)
High: fragmentary 7 (10%) 6 (8%) 2 (3%)
Note: Cells indicate the raw number of electoral terms for each constellation of party structural
change. The share of electoral terms from the total number of periods (71) is reported in paren-
theses.
In this section, we use electoral terms and key individual parties as supplementary vari-
ables. As mentioned above, the electoral term refers to the period between two elections;
however, in the plots below we identify a term by the first election in it.8 For the ease of
interpretation, in Table 3 and Table 4 we present the patterns of party structural change
8In the case of splits, we consider the main successor party as a continuation of the original party; in the
case of mergers, we consider the merged party as a continuation of one of the constituent parties if the latter
was substantially larger than other constituent parties.
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Table 4: Prevalence of the patterns of party structural change: parties
Permanent change
Limited High: aggregatory High: fragmentary
Temporary Limited 94 (29%) 29 (9%) 32 (10%)
change High: aggregatory 34 (11%) 14 (4%) 11 (3%)
High: fragmentary 57 (18%) 30 (9%) 18 (6%)
Note: Cells indicate the raw number of parties for each constellation of party structural change.
The share of electoral terms from the total number of periods (319) is reported in parentheses.
and stability in terms of 9 categories. Specifically, we code the electoral term or party
that had scores lower than 0 on Dimension 1 (Temporary change vs stability) as having
experienced limited amount of change. For the electoral terms or parties that had scores
higher than 0 on this dimension, we di↵erentiate (based on the scores on Dimension 4 -
Temporary aggregation vs fragmentation) between those where the change was predomi-
nantly of aggregatory nature (i.e. the scores on this dimension were below 0) and those
where it was mostly fragmentational (i.e. the scores on this dimension were above 0). Sim-
ilarly, for permanent change, we first capture the amount of change based on the scores on
Dimension 2 (Permanent stability vs change), and then capture its type based on Dimension
3.
Both tables indicate that the patterns of party structural change do not cluster on a
single dimension when electoral terms or individual parties as opposed to parties in electoral
terms are examined. For example, according to Table 3, 23 electoral terms (32 percent
of the total) could be classified as having experienced limited temporary and permanent
change; both temporary and permanent change was high in 16 or 22 percent of elections.
Out of the remaining 32 electoral terms, half experienced high temporary change but limited
permanent change, and in the other half the temporary change was limited but permanent
change was high. Similarly, 29 percent of individual parties experienced limited temporary
and permanent change; both temporary and permanent change was high in the case of 22
percent of parties; 29 percent of parties had high temporary and limited permanent change;
and the remaining 19 percent were more prone to permanent than to temporary change.
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To provide further insights into the patterns of party structural change, for each country
we present two plots. The plots on the left report the scores of Dimension 1 on X axis and
the scores of Dimension 4 on Y axis. Thus, they present the amount of temporary change
and its type. The plots on the right show the amount of permanent change (Dimension 2) on
X axis and the type of permanent change (Dimension 3) on Y axis. Thus, in each plot, the
top left quadrant indicates limited (temporary or permanent) fragmentation; the top-right
corner represents substantial fragmentation; the bottom-right quadrant shows substantial
aggregation; and the bottom-left corner shows limited aggregation.
Based on the observed patterns, we can di↵erentiate three groups of countries. The first
group, represented by Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania in Figure 2, exhibits (1) moderate
levels of permanent change leading to fragmentation throughout the period under study, (2)
substantial levels of temporary change throughout the whole period, although with distinct
cycles of fragmentation and aggregation.
Specifically, in Bulgaria, in all electoral terms with the exception of the 1994-1997 period
fragmentation was the dominant type of permanent party change, although the levels of this
change were rather limited. Splits were experienced by the parties across the ideological
spectrum, including the leftist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the centrist Simeon the
Second Movement (NDSV), the rightist Union of Democratic Forces (ODS) and the Citizens
for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), the agrarian Bulgarian National Agrarian
Union - People’s Union (BZNS-NS), the nationalist Ataka and the ethnic Turkish party
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS). The 1994-1997 period stands out as an exception
due to the formation of the ODS party through a merger of a large number of small rightist
parties.
In contrast, high levels of aggregation and fragmentation were present in Bulgaria when
it comes to temporary party change. The cycles of aggregation and fragmentation have been
primarily driven by the dynamics among the centre-right parties. The fragmentation of the
main coalition on the right, the Union of Democratic Forces, in the 1990-1994 period, was
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Figure 2: Patterns of party stability and change: Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania
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contained by a merger of its constituent parties and the formation of the broad United Demo-
cratic Forces coalition before the 1997 parliamentary election. The fragmentary tendencies,
however, returned before the 2005 election, when most rightist parties re-grouped into two
electoral coalitions (the United Democratic Forces and the People’s Union), and yet another
party, the Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB), ran as an independent entity. The small
rightist parties including the ODS and DSB then formed the Blue Coalition for the 2009
election, dissolved it before the 2013 election, and re-coalesced in the Reformist Coalition for
the 2014 election. Other parties, however, also participated in electoral alliances: the BSP
formed coalitions with di↵erent small leftist parties in the 1990s, and the DPS entered into
an alliance with several small parties for the 1997 election, although it dissolved it after the
election.
In Croatia, most of the parties that have been relevant since 1990, such as the right-
ist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the communist successor Social Democratic Party
(SDPH), the centre-right Croatian Social Liberal Party, the centrist Croatian Peasant Party
(HSS) and the radical right Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), experienced at least one split,
although at di↵erent time points. Mergers were rare, although the Croatian Popular Party
(HNS) and the HSLS each merged with smaller liberal parties in the 2003-2007 period, mak-
ing it somewhat of an exception compared to other periods. However, Croatian parties,
especially the centrist and leftist ones, have been involved in a large number of electoral
coalitions. Two major electoral coalitions that lost the 1990 election (the leftist coalition
of former communist and the Coalition of National Understanding) were dissolved by the
1992 election, which explains the high temporary fragmentation score of this electoral term.
Parties in opposition to the dominant HDZ formed electoral coalitions for the 1995 and
especially the 2000 parliamentary elections, but these coalitions changed substantially or
were terminated in the 2000s, after the opposition won the 2000 election. Only for the 2007
election several main parties of centre-left (SDPH, HNS, Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS)
and the Croatian Pensioners’ Union) formed the Kukuriku electoral coalition.
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Finally, in Romania, permanent party change has been fairly limited, and mostly involved
splits and mergers of small liberal parties in the 1990s. A major exception, however, is the
2000-2004 electoral term, which witnessed the merger between the communist successor
party called the Social Democracy of Romania (PDSR) and historical social democratic
Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR), as well as a number of mergers on the right,
with several small rightist parties being incorporated into the National Liberal Party (PNL)
and the merger between the National Peasant Party - Christian Democrats (PNTCD) and its
splinter National Christian Democratic Peasant Alliance (ANCD). In the 2008-2012 period,
the Social Democrats (PSD), PNL and the Hungarian ethnic party UDMR experienced minor
splits, resulting in a high temporary fragmentation score for this period.
Figure 3: Patterns of party stability and change: Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia
With regard to temporary party change, Romania experienced cycles of aggregation
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and fragmentation similar to those in Bulgaria and Croatia. The electoral dominance of the
former communists in the early 1990s led to the formation of broad centre-right coalition (the
Romanian Democratic Convention) before the 1992 and 1996 elections, albeit its membership
has shifted quite substantially. Furthermore, the Democratic Party (DP) and the PSDR
formed the Social-Democratic Pole (USD) coalition for the 1996 election. In the 1996-
2000 election, however, the fragmentary tendencies prevailed, as the USD coalition was
terminated, and the PNL and some smaller parties left the Democratic Convention coalition,
although the PDSR formed a coalition with PSDR and the Romanian Humanist Party (PUR;
later the Conservative Party - PC). In the 2000-2004 election, the major centre-right parties,
the DP and PNL, formed an electoral coalition called “Justice and Truth”. The alliance
was terminated in 2007, and for the 2008 election the PNL allied with the remnants of the
PNTCD. Finally, the 2008-2012 period witnessed important temporary aggregation when
the PSD, PNL, PC and the National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR) formed
the Social Liberal Alliance (USL), while the PD allied with the PNTCD and two other
miniscule parties.
Three countries in the sample demonstrated moderate levels of both permanent and
temporary change, although with some notable exceptions (see Figure 3). In the Czech
Republic, among the parties that competed in all elections since 1990, the Communists
(KCSM), the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL), the Social Democrats (CSSD) and the Civic
Democrats experienced at least one split each; the last three parties split in the 2006-2010
electoral term, which explains a high temporary fragmentation score of this period. The 1992-
1996 period by contrast witnessed some permanent aggregation as a result of the mergers
between the ODS and a small Christian Democratic Party (KDS), the Civic Movement (OH)
and the Liberal National Socialist Party (LSNS), and agrarian and Moravian regionalist
parties. In terms of temporary change, the Liberal Social Union electoral coalition was
formed for the 1992 election between agrarians, greens and the LSNS, only to be dissolved
by 1996; similarly, the Freedom Union - Democratic Union (US-DEU) and KDU-CSL formed
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an alliance for the 2002 election, but dissolved it after the election. This explains why these
two pairs of electoral terms are on di↵erent sides of the temporary aggregation-fragmentation
dimension in Figure 3.
Similarly, in Hungary, both permanent and temporary change has been relatively rare.
The rightist parties, including the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Hungarian
Christian Democratic Party (KDNP) and especially the Hungarian Smallholders’ Party
(FKgP), experienced multiple splits in the 1990s, and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)
split after its disastrous defeat in the 2010 election. As in the Czech Republic, several short-
lived electoral coalitions were formed among centrist and rightist parties, leading to moderate
cycles of temporary aggregation and fragmentation. These coalitions included the joint list
between Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party (MPP) and the MDF formed for the 2002 election
(the two parties also presented joint candidates in the 1998 election, but did not establish a
joint candidate list in the PR tier of the electoral system), only to be dissolved by the 2006
election; the Centre Party coalition formed for the 2002 election and dissolved by 2006, which
included the KDNP and its splinter, the Hungarian Democratic People’s Party (MDNP); and
the coalition between the MDF and SZDSZ founded before the 2010 election, which did not
last long due to the dissolution of the latter party after the election.
In Slovenia permanent change was also relatively rare. The 1992-1996 and 1996-2000
electoral terms stand out most clearly due to the mergers leading to the formation of the
Liberal Democracy (LDS) and United List of Social Democrats (ZSLD, later SDP) in the
first of these periods, and the merger between two key rightist parties (the Slovenian People’s
Party (SLS) and the Slovenian Christian Democrats (SKD)) in the second one. Most Slove-
nian parties also experienced at least one split, although they did so at di↵erent points in
time, meaning that no electoral term has a high score in terms of permanent fragmentation.
Electoral coalitions by contrast have been quite rare in Slovenia: only the 1992 election has
a relatively high score on temporary fragmentation as a consequence of the pensioners’ party
DeSUS to not terminate its electoral cooperation with three leftist parties that formed the
20
Figure 4: Patterns of party stability and change: Poland and Slovakia
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ZLSD.
Figure 5: Patterns of party stability and change: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
In the remaining five countries the patterns of party stability and change have been more
diverse. For the lack of space, we do not summarise them here in greater detail.
4.3 Understanding the patterns of party structural change and
stability
The patterns of party structural change and stability suggest little evidence to the single-
dimensional view of these phenomena. A logical implication of these results is that di↵erent
types of change can not be accounted for by the same factors. The limitations of space
prevent us from testing this hypothesis more systematically, and we leave this task for future
research. Nevertheless, in this sub-section we explore the e↵ect of several explanations of
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party structural change by using supplementary variables that are its potential causes. For
the ease of interpretation, we recode continuous supplementary variables into categorical
ones.
We first examine the e↵ect of (1) the number of democratic parliamentary elections held
by the country and (2) the age of party. Both variables are proxies to test the theoretical
hypotheses according to which party structural change and stability is a uni-dimensional
phenomenon. Specifically, partisan attachments tend to be weaker in younger democracies,
leading to higher rates of structural change. The voters of younger parties also tend to
be less partisan (Converse 1969; Huber, Kernell and Leoni 2005; Dalton and Weldon 2007;
Lupu and Stokes 2009); furthermore, younger parties are, on average, less institutionalised
internally (Harmel and Janda 1994) and have less stable dominant coalitions. Thus, younger
parties should also be more susceptible to experience all forms of change examined here. If,
however, we find that the age of democracy and the age of party are not related to some or
all dimensions uncovered by MCA, this would provide insights into why a uni-dimensional
pattern of structural change was not present in the results of empirical analysis.
Figure 6: The number of democratic electoral terms and party structural change
Figure 6 provides the placement of the categorical variable of the number of elections
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Figure 7: The age of parties and party structural change
held in relation to the four dimensions in our analysis. The graph on the left suggests that
the amount of temporary change tends to be higher in the second, third and fourth electoral
terms, especially compared to the fifth, sixth and seventh periods. The type of temporary
change (aggregation vs fragmentation) is less related to the age of democracy, as only the
eighth electoral term stands out, but this result is less reliable since only Bulgaria held
nine elections since the fall of communism. According to the graph on the right, there is
also a limited relationship between the amount or type of permanent change and the age of
democracy, as only the third electoral term stands out clearly in comparison to other electoral
terms by having more change of aggregatory type. Thus, a somewhat stronger e↵ect of the
age of democratic electoral competition on temporary change in comparison to permanent
change may, at least partially, be accountable for why di↵erent types of structural change
do not cluster into a single dimension.
Figure 7 indicates that the age of party also appears to have a stronger e↵ect on the
amount of temporary change as opposed to permanent change. Parties that were 5 years old
or younger at the time of the election in the beginning of the electoral term are in particular
more likely to enter and exit electoral coalitions while a similar e↵ect appears absent in the
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case of splits and mergers. The age of party, however, seems to have an e↵ect on the type
of permanent change: older parties (aged between 25 and 75 years) seem to be more likely
to split than to merge.
Figure 8: District magnitude and party structural change
Electoral system disproportionality, at least as measured by the average district magni-
tude, seems to have a limited e↵ect on the amount and type of both temporary and permanent
change (Figure 8).9 In fact, where district magnitude seems to have an e↵ect (the type of
permanent change), it is in contradiction to the theoretical expectations, as splits appear to
be the dominant form of permanent change in the countries with low district magnitudes
while mergers seem to be more frequent in the countries with high district magnitudes.
In contrast, party size is related to the amount of both temporary and permanent change
and the type of permanent change, as Figure 9 reports. Specifically, smaller parties are
more likely to experience temporary change but less likely to undergo permanent change
than larger parties. Moreover, when smaller parties experience permanent change, it is more
likely to be mergers, while larger parties are more likely to split, although there is no evidence
for the relationship between party size and the type of temporary change. This complex
9We use district magnitude because the variation in the type and size of the legal threshold was limited:
in most electoral terms analysed here legal threshold was nationwide and ranged between 3 and 5 percent.
25
relationship thus potentially provides an important explanation for the multidimensional
nature of the structural change phenomenon.
Figure 9: Vote share, government status and party structural change
On the other hand, there appears to be a limited relationship between party structural
change and government status. Even when we use a trichotomous variable for the participa-
tion in government that accounts for the parties that were in power for the whole electoral
term, those that were in opposition for the whole period, and those that were members of
government for some time, we only find a modest relationship between the type of temporary
change and government status.
Finally, Figure 10 presents the placement of the supplementary ideology variable, where
each party is coded as a liated with one of 11 ideological families.10 Party ideological family
seems to have a stronger impact on temporary than permanent change. As expected, radical
left and right parties are less likely to enter to and exit electoral coalitions in comparison to
all other parties with a notable exception of ethnic parties. Christian Democratic parties are
particularly likely to undergo temporary change. At the same time, there is little evidence
10Party family variable was coded primarily based on Do¨ring and Manow (2012). The more refined
variables of party policy based on party manifestos or expert surveys had too many missing values to be
used in the present analysis.
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Figure 10: Party ideological family and party structural change
that party ideology a↵ects the type of temporary change. Moving on to permanent change,
we find less of distinction between radical and moderate parties, although the communist
parties, together with ecological, regional, ethnic and special issue parties, seem to be some-
what less likely to split and merge in comparison to agrarian, Christian Democratic, social
democratic, radical right and particularly liberal parties. The di↵erences between party
families with regard to the type of permanent change are, however, quite limited.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to uncover the patterns of party stability and change in
post-communist democracies and to examine some explanations for these patterns in an
exploratory manner. We apply Multiple Correspondence Analysis to an original dataset
that records five types of party structural change whilst using the party-electoral term dyad
as a unit of analysis. The findings of empirical analyses contradict the notion that party
stability and change is a uni-dimensional phenomenon. Instead we suggest it is important to
distinguish between two types of change: temporary change (entry to and exit from electoral
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coalitions and changes in parties’ electoral labels) and permanent change (party splits and
mergers). A more fine-grained understanding should also discern between aggregation and
fragmentation within each of these two types of structural change.
By using electoral terms and parties as supplementary variables in our analysis, we show
that these distinct patterns of change are not an outcome of our choice of the unit of analysis.
In other words, a single dimension of party stability and change does not emerge when we
look at individual parties, electoral terms or countries. We were, however, able to tentatively
divide the countries in our sample into three groups in terms of their patterns of party
stability and change. Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania exhibit moderate levels of permanent
change, mostly fragmentation, and higher levels of temporary change, both aggregation and
fragmentation. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia have had moderate levels of both
permanent and temporary change of aggregatory and fragmentary type. The amount and
type of change in the third and largest group that contains the Baltic states, Poland and
Slovakia has varied more than in the other two groups, although the levels of change in these
countries, especially in Estonia and Slovakia, tend to decrease.
Finally, our exploratory analysis also suggests several insights to account for the lack of
a single-dimensional pattern of stability and change. Specifically, we find that the age of
democratic electoral competition and parties are more strongly related to temporary than
to permanent change. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship between the amount of
temporary change and party size is reverse to that of the correlation between the amount
of permanent change and size. There is also tentative evidence that parties that belong to
di↵erent ideological families undergo di↵erent types of change. These insights, in combination
with existing research on party mergers, splits, and electoral coalitions, provide the basis for
advancing the theoretical understanding of party stability and change.
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